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The introduction of the HDI sparked a major debate about the adequacy of income as a measure 
of development. Perhaps as a result, scholars have developed a number of novel measures of 
well being. Prominent among these is the use of happiness surveys to study well being in its 
various dimensions, ranging from well being within persons, to the determinants of well being 
across individuals, to the effects of contextual factors, such as the environment, political regime, 
and macroeconomic conditions. Sen’s capabilities approach to poverty, which underlies the HDI, 
highlights the lack of capacity of the poor to make choices or to take certain actions. Happiness 
surveys are a means to assess the well being of individuals who are constrained in their capacity 
to make choices  or reveal preferences. This paper reviews what we know about measuring 
quality of life, based on extensive work with happiness surveys in Latin America, and how that 
accumulated knowledge can inform the debate the HDI originally sparked. It also discusses how 
the surveys can contribute to our understanding and measurement of empowerment. It discusses 
the promises – and potential pitfalls – of directly applying the findings to policy, challenges 
which are germane to measuring and comparing empowerment across countries.   
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 1 
  The twentieth anniversary of the Human Development Index (HDI) provides an 
opportunity for the international development community to re-evaluate the ways we 
measure welfare and human progress. The introduction of the HDI sparked a major and 
still unresolved debate about the extent to which income-based measures are a sufficient 
gauge of development on the one hand, and about the viability and robustness of non-
income measures on the other. A minimum consensus underlying that debate seems to be 
that economic growth is a necessary but insufficient condition for countries to develop 
and thrive. Reflecting that implicit consensus, this year’s anniversary issue of the Human 
Development Report takes on the concept of human empowerment, and analyzes the 
extent to which it is feasible and productive to incorporate it into the HDI going forward.  
 
  Since the introduction of the HDI, meanwhile, a number of novel measures of 
well-being have been developed and applied in  research within and across countries. 
Prominent among these is the increasing use of happiness surveys by economists. These 
surveys are used to measure well-being in its various dimensions, from the range of 
domains that constitute well-being within persons, to the variance in the determinants of 
well-being  across  individuals, to the effects of contextual factors, such as the 
environment, political regime, and macroeconomic conditions.  
 
  Happiness surveys depart from traditional approaches in economic analysis, as 
they rely on expressed versus revealed preferences as a gauge of welfare or well-being. 
As such, they are uniquely well suited for answering questions that revealed preferences 
do not answer very well, such as the welfare effects of macro and institutional 2 
arrangements that individuals are powerless to change, and the explanation of behaviors 
that are driven by norms, addiction, and self control problems. The effects of inequality, 
macro-economic volatility, and different governance arrangements are examples of the 
former, and perverse consumption or other choices, such as alcohol and drug addition, 
obesity, or the lack of take-up of services by discriminated groups, are examples of the 
latter.  
 
Sen’s capabilities-based approach to poverty, which underlies the HDI, highlights 
the lack of capacity of the poor to make choices or to take certain actions. In many of his 
writings, Sen (1995) criticizes economists’ excessive focus on choice as a sole indicator 
of human behavior. Along these same lines, happiness surveys are a means to assess the 
well-being of individuals who are constrained in their capacity to make choices. As such, 
they could be a useful tool for exploring the concept of empowerment, simply defined in 
this paper as the capacity of individuals to control their economic lives and political 
choices.  
 
  This paper reviews what we know about measuring quality of life based on 
happiness and other well-being surveys, with examples from extensive research in Latin 
America. It discusses how that accumulated knowledge can inform the broader debate 
that the HDI originally sparked, and posits that happiness surveys can contribute to our 
understanding of the concept of empowerment, as well as to its more practical application 
in the HDI context. It concludes with a discussion of the promises – and the potential 
pitfalls – of directly applying the findings based on these measures to policy, challenges 3 
which are very relevant to attempts to measure and compare empowerment across 
countries.   
 
HDI and Income-Based Measures of Progress over the Past Years 
 
  An important example of the kind of debate that the HDI triggered is that over 
convergence versus divergence between developing and developed countries. This debate 
has primarily focused on GDP growth as a metric. To a large extent the debate is driven 
by how much analysis accounts for the large population size in large and fast growing 
countries like India, China, and more recently, Brazil, versus much smaller populations in 
the slow or negative growth rate countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition, though, 
there are clearly major differences in the economic performance of developing economies 
across the world, differences which are driven by the policy choices made by particular 
countries,  by institutional and other endowments, and  by regional and global 
macroeconomic conditions.  
 
It is well beyond the scope of this paper to review the debate over convergence 
and the factors that are and are not accounted for in cross-country growth regressions. 
(For an excellent summary of the different kinds of conclusions that can be drawn from 
these regressions, see Easterly (2009)).  What is  relevant here is the extent to which 
differences in countries’ records in reducing income-based poverty are a result of the 
metrics that are utilized to make comparisons.   
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  Measures of world-wide progress based on the HDI tell a slightly different story, 
meanwhile. Despite the inability of many poor countries to converge in income terms, 
they have actually been achieving improvements in human development at a much 
quicker pace than the richest countries of the world. This holds when using various 
measures of change in HDI: the annual rate of change in HDI, the annual rate weighted 
by human development level, and the short-fall gap weighted by human development 
level. 
 
  The second part of the HDI story – which is more nuanced than convergence 
versus divergence – is heterogeneity in HDI trends, by region of the world, period of 
reference, and sub-dimension of the index. Sixty countries in the sample experienced 
improvements in HDI primarily by increases in life expectancy, fifty-five by 
improvements in literacy, and five countries by improvements in income per capita. 
Achievements are faster for the post-1990 period than pre-1990, and they are faster in 
Africa than in Asia for both. Latin America is somewhere in the middle.  
 
  A third dimension of the story is about the determinants of change, a story which 
highlights the role of gender, fertility rates, and labor participation. Indeed, when fertility 
rates are controlled for, and the country sample includes only developing countries, the 
role of income in increasing both life expectancy and literacy disappears (in a cross 
country panel regression). The old saw that educating girls has major pay-offs in 
development terms is surely born out according to these measures of progress.  
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  The documentation of this story in a recent paper by Molina and Purser (2010) – 
based on new HDI data and mapping changes over time – is new. Yet the pattern is a 
more general historical one. Due to improvements in technology and public health – and 
their global diffusion – poor countries have been able to achieve much higher levels of 
life expectancy  and literacy  at lower levels of per capita income than the now rich 
countries were able to when they were developing and industrializing. And, because poor 
countries start from much lower levels of these indicators, it is easier to make dramatic 
improvements than it is at higher levels. Gains in life expectancy, for example, that result 
from halting preventable diseases – at lower levels of life expectancy – are much easier to 
make than are gains at high levels of life expectancy and that require the cure of complex 
diseases such as cancer. Increasing primary literacy where there is limited coverage by 
providing more schools is easier than increasing the diffusion of higher levels and higher 
skill sets of education.  
 
Thus the gains that the poor countries need to make to converge along these 
dimensions are easier to make than are the gains that rich countries need to stay equally 
far ahead. Many of these gains are made as a result of international interventions, such as 
vaccine campaigns. Achieving similar kinds of convergence in the economic growth 
arena, in contrast, requires countries improving governance regimes and public 
institutions, in addition to macroeconomic policy changes, changes which are difficult to 
make and even harder to sustain.  
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  Latin America as a region is at a transition point along these lines, which helps 
explain why it is in the middle of the pack in terms of speed of HDI gains. One reason 
Africa is such a rapid gainer is that it is starting from much lower levels. Another is the 
amount of foreign assistance and attention the region received – certainly relative to Latin 
America – in the 1990’s. Latin America, in contrast, had already made important gains in 
life expectancy, primary education, and the extension of basic health care services by the 
1990’s. While some countries, such as Chile, were leaps and bounds ahead of others, 
such as Guatemala, all but the very poorest countries in the region were well ahead of 
Africa in all of these areas.  
 
  Indeed, Latin America also undertook substantial economic changes during this 
period, changes which substantially changed the rewards structures to different skill sets. 
This was a period when the region liberalized its trade and financial sectors and 
substantially reduced the size of its public sectors (and public sector employment). The 
results, in terms of returns to human capital, were mixed. When the region opened up to 
free trade, rather than low skilled labor benefiting, as the theory would predict, instead 
the market for low skilled labor-based trade was taken up by India and China. In Latin 
America, it was high skilled – e.g. university educated – labor that benefited from the 
opening of the trading and financial sectors. Because high skilled labor was relatively 
scarce, the difference in rewards to high and low skilled labor increased. Meanwhile, with 
the scaling back of the public sector, workers with only secondary education saw the 
number of available  jobs reduced substantially and the returns to their education 7 
decrease, as reported by Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely (2000) [See Figure 1] As a 
result, the region’s already notoriously high levels of inequality increased.  
 
  At the same time, the region probably continued to make progress precisely 
because it was making public sector reforms which enhanced the ability of those 
institutions to extend services to the poorest sectors (often at the expense of the middle). 
In the late 1980’s and early 1990’s, this shift in targeting occurred via the wide-spread 
introduction of social funds throughout the region. In the latter part of the decade and into 
the next, several countries – most notably Mexico and Brazil – introduced large scale, 
conditional cash transfer programs, such as Progresa and the Bolsa Familiar, which both 
reduced poverty and encouraged increased usage of primary health and education 
services at the same time. (On targeting and social funds, see Graham (1994); on public 
sector reforms, see Graham (1998); on conditional cash transfer programs see Levy 
(2007)). 
 
  The convergence in HDI story is a classic example of how different benchmarks 
of progress produce a very different picture of the state of human well-being. Neither 
story alone is complete. Surely people are better off in countries where they have more 
literacy and higher levels of life expectancy. But if they are in contexts where economies 
do not provide opportunities for advancement, those gains will have limited effects. At 
the same time,  people likely have all sorts of amenities and opportunities in higher 
income countries that they do not have in lower income ones. But if due to high levels of 
income inequality, a significant part of the population is either infirm or illiterate, they 8 
can hardly benefit from them. Latin America, with its high levels of inequality, is case in 
point.  
 
  And, despite the different stories told by different metrics, neither tells us much 
about human freedom, empowerment, and capacity to choose one’s destiny within these 
countries. This is a question which is of deep importance, but is rift with measurement 
and definitional problems. It is surely a challenge to incorporate this concept into the 
HDI, but it is one that is integral to a complete understanding of human development and 
well-being. The analytical approach that is used in happiness economics may provide a 
metric for beginning to address that challenge.  
 
The Economics of Happiness 
 
The economics of happiness is an approach to assessing welfare which combines 
the techniques typically used by economists with those more commonly used by 
psychologists. While psychologists have long used surveys of reported well-being to 
study happiness, economists only recently ventured into this arena. Early economists and 
philosophers, ranging from Aristotle to Bentham, Mill, and Smith, incorporated the 
pursuit of happiness in their work. Yet, as economics grew more rigorous and 
quantitative, more parsimonious definitions of welfare took hold. Utility was taken to 
depend only on income as mediated by individual choices or preferences within a rational 
individual’s monetary budget constraint.  
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Even within a more orthodox framework, focusing purely on income can miss key 
elements of welfare. People have different preferences for material and non-material 
goods. They may choose a lower-paying but more personally rewarding job, for example. 
They are nonetheless acting to “maximize utility” in the neoclassical economics sense.   
 
The study of happiness or subjective well-being is part of a more general move in 
economics that challenges these narrow assumptions. The introduction of bounded 
rationality  –  which posits that most people are only as rational as their available 
information, environment, and intellect permit  –  and the establishment of behavioral 
economics have opened new lines of research. Happiness economics – which represents 
one new direction – relies on more expansive notions of utility and welfare, including 
interdependent utility functions, procedural utility, and the interaction between rational 
and non-rational influences in determining economic behavior.  
 
Richard Easterlin was the first modern economist to revisit the concept of 
happiness, beginning in the early 1970s. More generalized interest took hold in the late 
1990s, and a number of economists began to study happiness and its relationship with a 
number of variables of interest, ranging from income, socio-demographic variables, and 
employment status to the nature of political regimes, the level of economic development, 
and the scope and quality of public goods, among others (see Easterlin, 1974; 2003; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Frey and Stutzer, 2002a; 
Graham and Pettinato, 2002; Layard, 2005). 
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The economics of happiness does not purport to replace income-based measures 
of welfare but instead to complement them with broader measures of well-being. These 
measures are based on the results of large-scale surveys, across countries and over time, 
of hundreds of thousands of individuals who are asked to assess their own welfare. The 
surveys provide information about the importance of a range of factors which affect well-
being, including income but also others such as health, marital and employment status, 
and civic trust.  
 
The approach, which, as noted above, relies on expressed preferences rather than 
on revealed choices, is particularly well suited to answering questions in areas where a 
revealed preferences approach provides limited information. Indeed, it often uncovers 
discrepancies between expressed and revealed preferences. Standard economics relies on 
revealed preferences –  typically measured by consumption choices –  as a gauge of 
individual welfare. Indeed, for many years, economists shied away from survey data – 
e.g. expressed preferences. The assumption was that these data could not be trusted: there 
is no consequence to answering surveys, as opposed to the trade-offs involved in making 
consumption choices. Yet, as noted above, revealed preferences cannot fully gauge the 
welfare effects of particular policies or institutional arrangements which individuals are 
powerless to change.  
 
Happiness surveys are based on questions in which the individual is asked, 
‘Generally speaking, how happy are you with your life’ or ‘how satisfied are you with 
your life’, with possible answers on a four-to-seven point scale. Psychologists have a 11 
preference for life satisfaction questions. Yet answers to happiness and life satisfaction 
questions correlate quite closely. The correlation coefficient between the two – based on 
research on British data for 1975–92, which includes both questions, and Latin American 
data for 2000–1, in which alternative phrasing was used in different years –  ranges 
between .56 and .50 (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Graham and Pettinato, 2002).  
 
Differences in the phrasing of happiness questions present several methodological 
challenges. The particular kind of happiness question that is used matters to the results. 
For example, respondents’ income level seems to matter more to their answers to life 
satisfaction questions than it does to their answers to questions which are designed to 
gauge the innate character component of happiness (affect), as gauged by questions such 
as “how many times did you smile yesterday”. In more technical terms, the correlation 
between life satisfaction questions and income is much stronger than that between affect 
questions and income.  
 
Happiness questions are also particularly vulnerable to order bias – in other words 
where they are placed in a survey. People will respond differently to an open-ended 
happiness question that is in the beginning of a survey than to one that is framed or 
biased by the questions posed beforehand, such as those about whether income is 
sufficient or the quality of their job. To minimize this, happiness or life satisfaction 
questions must be placed at the beginning of surveys. And, as with all economic 
measurements,  any individual’s answer  may be biased by idiosyncratic, unobserved 12 
events (ranging from the break up of a relationship to the victory of a favorite team in 
football on the day that the respondent answers a survey).  
 
Bias in answers to happiness surveys can also result from unobserved personality 
traits and related errors which affect how the same individuals answer a range of 
questions. A naturally curmudgeonly person, for example, will answer all sorts of 
questions in a manner that is more negative than the average. (These concerns can be 
addressed via econometric techniques if and when we have panel data). Related concerns 
about unobservable variables are common to all economic disciplines, and not unique to 
the study of happiness. For example, a naturally cheerful person may respond to policy 
measures differently and/or put more effort in the labor market than the average. Standard 
analysis would attribute those outcomes to differences in incentives rather than in 
character, which would introduce error into the resulting conclusions.  
 
Despite the potential pitfalls, cross-sections of large samples across countries and 
over time find remarkably consistent patterns in the determinants of happiness. 
Psychologists, meanwhile, find validation in the way that people answer these surveys 
based in physiological measures of happiness, such as the frontal movements in the brain 
and in the number of ‘genuine’ – Duchenne – smiles (Diener and Seligman, 2004).  
 
Micro-econometric happiness equations have the standard form: Wit = α + βxit + 
εit , where W is the reported well-being of individual i at time t, and X is a vector of 
known variables including socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. 13 
Unobserved characteristics and measurement errors are captured in the error term. 
Because the answers to happiness surveys are ordinal rather than cardinal, they are best 
analyzed via ordered logistic or probability (probit) equations. These equations depart 
from standard regression equations, which explore a continuous relationship between 
variables (for example happiness and income), and instead explore the probability that an 
individual will place him or herself in a particular category, typically ranging from 
unhappy to very happy. These regressions typically yield lower R-squares  than 
economists are used to. This reflects the extent to which emotions and other components 
of true well-being are driving the results, as opposed to the variables that we are able to 
measure, such as income, education, and marital and employment status.  
 
The availability of panel data in some instances, as well as advances in 
econometric techniques, are increasingly allowing for sounder analysis (Van Praag and 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). The coefficients produced from ordered probit or logistic 
regressions are remarkably similar to those from OLS regressions based on the same 
equations, allowing us to substitute OLS equations for ordered logit or probit and then 
attach relative weights to them. While it is impossible to measure the precise effects of 
independent variables on true well-being, happiness researchers have used the 
coefficients on these variables as a basis for assigning relative weights to them. They can 
estimate how much income a typical individual in the United States or Britain would 
need to produce the same change in stated happiness that comes from the well-being loss 
resulting from, for example, divorce ($100,000) or job loss ($60,000) (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 2004).  14 
This research highlights the importance of the non-income determinants of well-
being – such as health, education, and social arrangements – in a manner that traditional 
measures do not and that could serve as a complement to the HDI. While these weights 
should be taken as differences in orders of magnitude rather than as precise numbers that 
can quantify happiness, they still give us a very different picture of the role of income in 
determining  well-being  than do income measures alone, analogous to the different 
measures of progress and development that are highlighted by the HDI.  
 
Table 1 shows basic happiness regressions for three very different regions: Latin 
America, Russia, and the United States. The regressions reported therein are ordered logit 
specifications, which in theory do not allow for comparing the weights of coefficients. 
Yet the same equations, run with OLS specifications, yield virtually identical results. 
Assuming that rough comparisons can be made (as has become standard practice in the 
literature), these tables suggest that in all instances health is more important to well-being 
than is income in all three very different regions. Figure 2, meanwhile, shows the relative 
importance of friendships to happiness in Latin America. After having enough food to 
eat, having friends or family to rely on in times of need is more important to the 
happiness of Latin Americans than is a job, health, or personal assets.   
 
When the sample is split into respondents that are above and below median 
income, meanwhile, the “friends-effect” holds for the poor sub-sample, while work and 
health are more important to the well-being  of the wealthier group. While one can 
imagine the effect that these variables have on well-being  in general, this difference 15 
makes sense in a region where there are few institutionalized systems of social insurance. 
The rich have much more of a guarantee that their work and their health will allow them 
to provide for themselves and their families, while the poor are realistic in knowing that 
they are likely to have to rely on friends or family in times of need.  
 
More generally, while there are surely modest differences across regions, 
happiness research allows us to identify the non-income factors that are most important to 
well-being. It also allows us to make at least rough comparisons of their relative 
importance, as well as benchmark them against income-based metrics. Table 2, which 
compares Latin America to the rest of the world along these lines, is illustrative.  
 
The Easterlin paradox 
 
In his original study, Easterlin revealed a paradox that sparked interest in the topic 
but is as yet unresolved. While most happiness studies find that within countries wealthier 
people are, on average, happier than poor ones, studies across countries and over time 
find very little, if any, relationship between increases in per capita income and average 
happiness levels. On average, wealthier countries (as a group) are happier than poor ones 
(as a group); happiness seems to rise with income up to a point, but not beyond it. Yet 
even among the less happy, poorer countries, there is not a clear relationship between 
average income and average happiness levels, suggesting that many other factors – 
including cultural traits – are at play. [See Figure 3]  
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More recently, there has been renewed debate over whether there is an Easterlin 
paradox or not. A number of scholars, such as Deaton (2008), and Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008), have published papers demonstrating a clear, relationship between per capita 
incomes and average happiness levels, with no sign that the correlation weakens, either as 
income levels increase or over time on a log-linear model specification. Indeed, the work 
of both sets of authors suggests that the slope may be steeper for richer countries, most 
likely because wealthier people are better able to enjoy higher levels of income than are 
poor ones (a greed effect?).  Deaton gets a positive and significant coefficient on a 
squared specification of the income variable. Stevenson and Wolfers split their sample 
into those countries above and below $15,000 per capita (in year 2000 U.S. dollars), they 
get a slightly steeper slope for the rich countries than for the poor ones. 
 
Both of these studies rely on the newly available Gallup World Poll, which covers 
over 120 countries world-wide, as well as some different data sets for earlier years. 
Inglehart et al (2008), meanwhile, in a new analysis of data from the World Values 
Survey for 1981-2006 finds that subjective well-being rose in 77% of the 52 countries for 
which time series is available. Lora and colleagues at the Inter-American Development 
Bank  (2008), using Gallup data for Latin America, also find a positive relationship 
between per capita income levels and average happiness levels.  
 
  Other studies come out somewhere in the middle. My own work with Stefano 
Pettinato – the first study of happiness in a large sample of developing countries, using 
absolute levels of per capita GDP, finds that, on average, happiness levels are higher in 17 
the developed than in the developing countries in the sample, but that within each group 
of countries, there is no clear income-happiness relationship. [Figure 3]  
 
Why the discrepancy? For a number of reasons – many of them methodological, 
the divergent conclusions may each be correct. The relationship between happiness and 
income is mediated by a range of factors that can alter its slope and/or functional form. 
These include the particular questions that are used to measure happiness; the selection of 
countries that is included in the survey sample; the specification of the income variable 
(log or linear); the rate of change in economic conditions in addition to absolute levels; 
and changing aspirations as countries go from the ranks of developing to developed 
economies. It is not much of an intellectual stretch, meanwhile, to see how the debate 
over the Easterlin paradox is analogous to the discrepancies that economists find as they 
compare countries’ development progress based on income based and HDI based 
measures.  
 
There is much less debate about the relationship between income and happiness 
within countries. Income matters to happiness (Oswald,  1997; Diener et al.,  2003), 
among others). Deprivation and abject poverty in particular are very bad for happiness. 
Yet after basic needs are met other factors such as rising aspirations, relative income 
differences, and the security of gains become increasingly important, in addition to 
income. Long before the economics of happiness was established, Duesenberry (1949) 
noted the impact of changing aspirations on income satisfaction and its potential effects 
on consumption and savings rates. A number of happiness studies have since confirmed 18 
the effects of rising aspirations, and have also noted their potential role in driving 
excessive consumption and other perverse economic behaviours (Frank, 1999).   
 
Thus, a common interpretation of the Easterlin paradox is that humans are on a 
‘hedonic treadmill’: aspirations increase along with income and, after basic needs are 
met, relative rather than absolute levels of income matter to well-being. Another 
interpretation of the paradox is the psychologists’ ‘set point’ theory of happiness, in 
which every individual is presumed to have a happiness level that he or she goes back to 
over time, even after major events such as winning the lottery or getting divorced 
(Easterlin, 2003). The implication of this theory for policy is that nothing much can be 
done to increase happiness. 
 
Individuals are remarkably adaptable, no doubt, and in the end can get used to 
most things, and in particular to income gains. They can also get used to misery. As is 
discussed in greater detail below, individuals’ psychological capacity to adapt – even to 
what seem to be intolerable conditions in some instances –  may result in collective 
tolerance for very bad equilibrium. 
 
The behavioral economics literature, meanwhile, shows that individuals value 
losses more than gains (see Kahneman, Diener and Schwarz, 1999, among others). 
Related to this, my own research finds that people have a hard time adapting to 
uncertainty. Economic crisis, for example, is deleterious for happiness, not least because 
of the uncertainty that it causes. During 1998 crisis in Russia and the 2001 crisis in 19 
Argentina, happiness levels fell significantly: 8.7% and 10.7% respectively. It is 
important to put these movements in perspective: average national happiness levels do 
not move much, if it all, over time. While happiness levels eventually recovered, along 
with the respective economies, the falls are of a remarkable order of magnitude.  
 
In related work, Sandip Sukhtankar and I examined the effects of the 2001-2002 
crises in Latin America on happiness in the region in general. We separated our sample of 
18 countries in the Latinobarometro data set into those countries that had experienced 
negative levels of GDP growth (the crisis countries) and those that had not (see Graham 
and Sukhtankar, 2004).
 While this is far from a perfect definition of crisis, it is surely a 
parsimonious one. Individuals in the crisis countries had above average happiness levels 
before the crisis, and below average levels after (controlling for the usual socio-economic 
and demographic factors). The effects were large, but temporary. In subsequent years, as 
growth recovered, happiness in most of these countries returned to the pre crisis level. 
[Figure 4] 
 
My  newest research –  with Soumya Chattopadhyay and Mario Picon,  see 
Graham, Chattopadhyay, and Picon, (forthcoming), and based on a new Gallup survey of 
approximately 1000 Americans per day from January 2008 to the present – shows that 
average happiness in the U.S. declined significantly as the Dow fell with the onset of the 
crisis. It fell 11% from 6.94 (on an 11 point scale) prior to the onset of the crisis, to a low 
of 6.19 on November 16, 2008. Yet when the market stopped bottoming out and some 
semblance of stability was restored in late March 2009, average happiness recovered 20 
much faster than the Dow. By June 2009 it was higher than its pre-crisis level: 7.15 on 
June 21 – even though living standards and reported satisfaction with those standards 
remained markedly lower than they were prior to the crisis. Once the period of 
uncertainty ended, people seemed to be able to return to previous happiness levels, while 
making do with less income or wealth. Adapting to unpleasant certainty seems to be 
easier than coping with uncertainty. [See Figure 5] 
 
Easterlin argues that individuals adapt more in the income or financial arenas than 
in non-income related arenas (as the above example suggests), while life changing events 
have lasting effects on happiness. Yet, because most policy is based on pecuniary 
measures of well-being, it overemphasizes the importance of income gains to well-being 
and underestimates that of other factors, such as health, family, and stable employment. 
The issue of adaptation, meanwhile, poses significant challenges for the task of 
measuring empowerment (discussed below).  
 
Selected applications  
 
Some studies have attempted to separate the effects of income from those of other 
endogenous factors, such as satisfaction in the workplace. Studies of unexpected lottery 
gains find that these isolated gains have positive effects on happiness, although it is not 
clear that they are of a lasting nature (Gardner and Oswald, 2001). Other studies have 
explored the reverse direction of causality, and find that people with higher happiness 
levels tend to perform better in the labour market and to earn more income in the future 
(Diener et al., 2003; Graham, Eggers and Sukhtankar, 2004). 21 
A related question, and one which is still debated in economics and is surely 
relevant to the concept of empowerment if defined as individuals’ ability to define their 
own destiny, is how income inequality affects individual welfare. Interestingly, the 
results differ between developed and developing economies. Most studies of the United 
States and Europe find that inequality has modest or insignificant effects on happiness. 
The mixed results may reflect the fact that inequality can be a signal of future opportunity 
and mobility as much as it can be a sign of injustice (Alesina et al., 2004). In contrast, 
recent research on Latin America finds that inequality is negative for the well-being of 
the poor and positive for the rich. In a region where inequality is much higher and where 
public institutions and labour markets are notoriously inefficient, inequality signals 
persistent disadvantage or advantage rather than opportunity and mobility (Graham and 
Felton, 2005). 
 
Happiness surveys also facilitate the measurement of the effects of broader, non-
income components of inequality, such as race, gender, and status, all of which seem to 
be highly significant (Graham and Felton, 2005). These results find support in work in 
the health arena, which finds that relative social standing has significant effects on health 
outcomes (Marmot, 2004). 
 
Happiness research can deepen our understanding of poverty. The set point theory 
suggests that a destitute peasant can be very happy, while a millionaire can be miserable. 
(What I  call the “happy peasant” problem in much of the literature). While this 
contradicts a standard finding – namely, that poor people are less happy than wealthier 22 
people within countries – it is suggestive of the role that low expectations or adaptation to 
bad circumstances can play in explaining persistent poverty in some cases. The 
procedural utilities and capabilities approaches, meanwhile, emphasize the constraints on 
the choices of the poor.  
 
What is perceived to be poverty in one context may not be in another. People who 
are high up the income ladder can identify themselves as poor, while many of those who 
are below the objective poverty line do not, because of different expectations (Rojas, 
2004). In addition, the well-being of those who have escaped poverty is often undermined 
by insecurity and the risk of falling back into poverty. Income data does not reveal the 
vulnerability of these individuals, yet happiness data shows that it has strong negative 
effects on their welfare. Indeed, their reported well-being is often lower than that of the 
poor (Graham and Pettinato, 2002).  
 
Happiness surveys can be used to examine the effects of different macro-policy 
arrangements on well-being. Most studies find that inflation and unemployment have 
negative effects on happiness. The effects of unemployment are stronger than those of 
inflation, and hold above and beyond those of forgone income (Di Tella, MacCulloch and 
Oswald, 2001). The standard ‘misery index’, which assigns equal weight to inflation and 
unemployment, may be underestimating the effects of the latter on well-being (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002b).  
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Political and other institutional arrangements also matter. Much of the literature 
finds that both trust and freedom have positive effects on happiness (Helliwell, 2003; 
Layard, 2005). Research based on variance in voting rights across cantons in Switzerland 
finds that there are positive effects from participating in direct democracy (Frey and 
Stutzer, 2002b). Research in Latin America finds a strong positive correlation between 
happiness and preference for democracy (Graham and Sukhtankar, 2004). There is some 
recent research that shows that higher levels of participation in religious organizations is 
linked to higher levels of happiness – even for the non-religious respondents that live in 
those regions. (Clark and Lelkes, 2009). These findings hold even when controls for 
social capital –  e.g. the extent to which people participate in all sorts of civic 
organizations – are included. At the same time, both sets of variables may be picking 
unobservable character traits that explain both civic and religious participation. These 
issues are, of course, relevant to how we conceptualize and attempt to measure 
empowerment.  
 
Finally, people seem to adapt to institutional and other social arrangements that 
are non-optimal, such as high levels of crime and corruption. In recent work on Latin 
America with Soumya Chattopadhyay, I find that the higher the generalized crime level 
or crime norm in a country, the lower the unhappiness effect of being a crime victim (see 
Graham and Chattopadhyay, 2008b). A related study by Cardenas et al (2009) finds that 
respondents that report having been a victim of crime once in the past year are less 
happy, on average, than others, but those that report being a victim of more than one 
crime show no significant negative effects on wellbeing. Both studies are likely picking 24 
up some sort of adaptation to higher levels of crime, as well as the higher stigma that 
comes from being victimized when crime is a less common event. Powdthavee (2005) 
reports similar evidence in South Africa.  
 
Andy Felton and I, meanwhile, find similar evidence of adaptation in the health 
arena in the United States. While obese people are, on average, less happy than others, 
they are far less unhappy when they are in higher obesity cohorts – where obesity is the 
norm and there is less stigma. These cohorts tend to be lower income and lower skilled 
professionally, and also typically have less upward income mobility than others. As noted 
above, adaptation to these phenomena may be good from an individual psychological 
perspective but bad in collective terms.  
 
Using Happiness Surveys to Measure Empowerment: A Suggested Methodological 
Approach and Some Conceptual Challenges 
 
Can happiness and other quality of life measures help us define and understand 
empowerment? Accurately assessing or measuring empowerment is a complex challenge, 
not least because of the difficulty of defining the concept. Empowerment can be 
conceived of very simply in economic dimensions, such as the extent to which people 
have a sense of control over their own destinies and opportunities for future mobility (a 
definition that seems the most feasible for the author of this paper). Yet the concept also 
has many other dimensions, such as political freedom and voice; access to social 
networks and the wide range of support that they provide, both for upward mobility and 
protection from vulnerability; and freedom from discrimination at many levels, ranging 25 
from gender within the household to ethnic and racial distinctions in communities and 
countries.  
 
The definition of empowerment is key to its measurement, and that exercise is 
beyond the scope of this paper. While well-being  surveys cannot solve questions of 
definition, they may be a good way to gauge the extent to which people feel empowered 
(or not), once a definition is agreed upon. Well-being surveys get around the problem that 
is posed in assessing the preferences of individuals who lack the capacity or agency to 
make choices.  
 
  There are a number of standard questions in most well-being surveys that could 
be used to gauge the extent to which people feel empowered, and how that varies across a 
particular population. One very simple – and unframed question – asks people about their 
and their children’s future prospects of mobility. The question asks respondents if they 
think they will live better, the same or worse, in the future than they do now, and then 
repeats the question, asking them how they think they children will live in the future 
compared to how the respondents themselves live now.  
 
My own research, and that of several others, shows that those that have high 
prospects of upward mobility –  for themselves and for their children –  are typically 
happier and more optimistic than the average, more willing to put forth effort in the labor 
market, and more likely to invest in their future, both via their own savings and via 
investments in their children’s education. At the simplest level, this is a form of 26 
empowerment: they are vested enough in the system to have faith in its ability to provide 
them opportunities in the future and as a result are willing to invest in their own destiny. 
Respondents with lower prospects of upward mobility, meanwhile, typically are less 
happy and optimistic and have higher discount rates when it comes to investments in their 
own economic future and even in their own health. (See Birdsall and Graham (2000) and 
the essays there-in; Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtankar (2004); and Haskins and Sawhill 
(2009)).  
 
  More complex conceptualizations of empowerment – such as those pertaining to 
political agency, social networks, and freedom from discrimination, could also be 
explored by well-being surveys. There are many questions that I (and other scholars) 
have used, which range from those designed to gauge levels of trust in the system and in 
particular institutions (political and other); to those which gauge faith in the economic 
system, by asking respondents if they believe that “a poor person in your country can 
overcome poverty if he or she works hard”, and/or which ask whether hard work or 
connections are more important to success; to those which ask respondents if they have 
friends or family they can rely on at times of need, among others. There are also a range 
of questions which attempt to measure social and ethnic cohesion, by asking respondents 
to self report as a minority or not, and/or to report if they have felt discrimination on the 
grounds of socioeconomic status, regional origin, or race.  
 
  The responses to such questions can then be analyzed in a multivariate framework 
which explores the extent to which positive (or negative) scores on the various measures 27 
of empowerment correlate with outcome variables of interest, such as socio-economic 
status, preference for democracy, trust in institutions, and so on. The results of such an 
analysis might even help narrow down the most useful definition of empowerment for 
possible incorporation into the HDI.  
 
  Such an exercise is not free of measurement and other methodological challenges. 
At the same time it provides an opportunity to use survey research to compare levels of 
empowerment across countries and across cohorts within them, while fine tuning the 
definition of the concept along the way. Many of these questions have been used in Latin 
America already, via the Latinobarometro and ECOSOCIAL survey. The region’s 
diversity in terms of poverty levels, institutional capacity, and variance in ethnic 
composition provide a good testing ground, meanwhile.  
 
  One way to take on this exercise would be to begin with three sets of questions, 
each of which represents a dimension of empowerment: opportunity, trust in the system, 
and freedom from discrimination. The first set would include a question about how 
respondents saw their economic future (five or ten years hence) compared to their current 
situation (worse, same, better); how they lived today compared to five years ago, and 
then how their children would live compared to how they live (worse, same, better). 
Another question, which can be used to gauge attitudes about mobility is whether 
education or connections are more important to getting ahead. I have used such questions 
in countries around the world, and most extensively in Latin America, and they seem to 
be consistent estimators of attitudes about mobility and opportunity. These perceptions of 28 
mobility would have to then be benchmarked against objective data on the respondent’s 
income and education levels, age, race, and gender, among other variables. If panel data 
were available, they could also be benchmarked against objective trends in mobility. 
 
  A second set of questions would explore general levels of trust in the system, as 
well as how they vary across countries and cohorts within them. These would combine 
attitudes about the system’s ability to provide widely shared opportunities with those 
about public institutions. To capture the first, this set of questions could include: “a poor 
person in your country can overcome poverty if she or he works hard”; and “in this 
country, is it more important to work hard or to have connections to get ahead” or some 
derivation there-of. Finally, a question about safety nets and social capital might also 
relevant, such as whether the respondent has friends or family he or she can rely on at 
times of need. Trust in government, meanwhile, should be broken up into macro and 
micro level institutions, and cover respondents’ levels of trust in the parliament, political 
parties, the judiciary, and the police, among others. An additional and more objective 
question, which would help benchmark the results on levels of trust  against actual 
experience in the institutional framework, would ask respondents whether or not they had 
been a victim of crime or corruption (in separate, respective questions) in the past year.  
 
  The third set of questions would explore discrimination. The ECOSOCIAL asks 
respondents whether or not they feel have been discriminated against due to their race, to 
their region of origin, or to their socioeconomic status (in respective questions). These 
questions would then be benchmarked against  objective socioeconomic data: 29 
respondents’ ethnic identity, whether they were a minority or not; whether they were 
migrants or not (defined as having been born in the place that they now live); and their 
socioeconomic status and gender, among other things.  
 
  The results from this exercise would likely result in some modification of the 
questions and conceptual strategy. My own research on trust in the system in Latin 
America in Graham and Picon (2009), for example, finds some paradoxical results which 
on the one hand suggest that caution in necessary in inferring too much from survey data 
and on the other suggests that empowerment may be inversely linked to trust in the 
“system”, at least as it is currently functioning in Latin America. The paradoxes and 
inconsistencies in the responses, meanwhile, suggest caution in combining the results 
from the three sets of questions into one composite measure or index, as the results for 
the same respondents or cohorts do not always run in a consistent direction.  
 
We find, for example, that the least educated respondents and migrants are the 
most trusting of public institutions, with the exception of the police, which is likely the 
one institution that they have direct knowledge of. At the same time, wealthier and more 
educated respondents are much less trusting of the institutions of government and more 
trusting of the police. Believing that there are opportunities for the poor is linked to 
higher prospects of upward mobility, meanwhile. Wealthier respondents, meanwhile, are 
less likely to believe the system provides broadly shared opportunities than are the poor, 
but more likely to believe in the role of education in success. This likely reflects their 30 
own experience: they know that the advantages provided by their education have served 
them well, and in the process of getting ahead are skeptical of the system’s fairness.  
 
These findings suggest that those respondents who have benefited the most from 
the system – who are also the most empowered – are also the most skeptical of it, while 
those who are the least empowered are rather naïve about how the system operates. At 
least in Latin America, there is likely to be a J-curve of sorts, where frustration with the 
system actually increases as citizens become more aware and “empowered”, frustration 
which may in the end increase public demand for better institutions.  
 
Another conceptual challenge that stems from our findings is related to perceived 
discrimination. In Latin America, perceived discrimination for socioeconomic reasons is 
much more prevalent than is discrimination for racial or regional regions. That said, 
respondents that report to perceive discrimination are significantly less happy than others, 
as well as less likely to believe that there are opportunities for the poor and that hard 
work is important to success. The direction of causality is difficult to establish, as less 
happy people are more likely to report discrimination. In addition, migrants and 
minorities were typically happier and had higher prospects of mobility than the average 
for Latin America. There is no direct correlation between minority and migrant status and 
perceptions of discrimination, meanwhile.  
 
All of this suggests that the measurement of empowerment is as difficult as its 
definition, as the most empowered respondents may be the most skeptical of precisely the 31 
institutions that benefit them the most. At the same time, perceptions of discrimination 
are driven by innate character traits as much as by environmental conditions. Those 
perceptions, in turn, have real effects on people’s decisions about work effort, savings, 
and education, and thus may play as negative a role in outcomes as can actual 
discrimination experiences.   
 
This is an example of how survey research can deepen our understanding of a 
concept such as empowerment in the process of attempting to measure it. It also suggests 
that regardless of how an index of empowerment is structured, it needs to incorporate 
both objective and subjective measures, so as to benchmark attitudes against objective 
measures. This, in turn, may then require the incorporation of econometric and other 
techniques which can account for non-linear relationships, such as trust in institutions 
initially decreasing as empowerment increases. This is particularly relevant in contexts 
where public institutions are still relatively weak, as in Latin America. 
 
The rest of the paper provides an example of a large scale application of well-
being surveys to the measurement of quality of life in Latin America, and then raises 
some challenges to directly applying the results to policy questions. The latter reflect 
some of the conceptual challenges highlighted in this section and are relevant to the 
exercise of measuring empowerment and incorporating the concept into policy decisions. 
This is surely not intended to discourage that effort, but rather to inform it and to raise 
some notes of caution going forward.   
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Using Happiness Surveys to Measure Quality of Life in Latin America 
 
In a recent cross-country research effort, sponsored by the Inter-American 
Development Bank,  Eduardo Lora  and I collaborated with teams from institutions 
throughout the region and used survey research to assess well-being across a range of 
domains. Our effort was a first step towards developing quality of life indicators that the 
Bank could potentially use in its work in the region.
 (Detailed results are in Graham and 
Lora (2009)). Our results are relevant to the challenge of incorporating a concept such as 
empowerment into a metric like the HDI, and suggest the potential and the limits of using 
happiness surveys as a tool for doing so.  
 
Latin America is a region that is diverse in terms of culture and levels of 
development. This provides a laboratory for studying how quality of life varies with a 
number of important objective and subjective measures, including per capita income but 
also including others such as job insecurity, job satisfaction, schooling attainment, 
educational quality, nutritional insecurity, personal insecurity, mortality, and self-
assessed health.  
 
  The concept of quality of life is a broad one, which incorporates basic needs but 
extends beyond them to include capabilities, as typically measured by the UNDP’s 
human development index (HDI); the “livability” of the environment, as measured by 
income per capita and growth; and life appreciation and happiness, as measured by well-
being surveys.  Our study focused on reported or subjective well-being (“happiness” or 33 
“satisfaction”), a concept that differs from but complements other indicators of the 
quality of life.   
 
The variables used in our study of  well-being  and quality of life were by 
definition multi-faceted. We used  individual and national level variables, as well as 
objective and subjective indicators. For objective indicators at the individual level, we 
used the standard socio-economic and demographic variables, such as income, housing 
characteristics, employment status, age, gender, and schooling levels. We also included 
assessments of inter-personal conditions, such as friendships and community 
engagement, and relative measures of economic status, such as reference group income. 
These objective indicators were matched with respondents’ assessments of their 
happiness, life satisfaction, satisfaction with domains such as security, health, education, 
and jobs, as well as assessments of the general situation of the country and the state of 
public services. (See Luttmer (2005), Lora (2008), and Graham and Felton (2006)). 
 
At the national level, our variables included economic indicators such as GDP, 
inflation, and levels of poverty and inequality, as well as political and institutional 
variables, such as rule of law and the quality of public institutions. These were then 
benchmarked against national averages of individual responses to happiness and life 
satisfaction questions, as well as those about the general situation of the country, 
economy, and public services. 
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We relied  primarily on the Gallup World Poll.  The world poll has been 
conducted annually for years, but since 2006 has expanded its coverage to over 130 
countries, of which 23 to 25 are from Latin America, depending on the year, and also 
includes several questions about life satisfaction. Approximately 1000 individuals are 
interviewed in each country, and the surveys are nationally representative. There are over 
100 quality of life related questions in the World Poll, and 25 of them are asked in Latin 
America only. We complemented the Gallup World Poll data with various other data 
sources, such as standard household surveys on income and employment.  We also made 
some  use of the Latinobarómetro public opinion survey, which has been  polling 
approximately 18,000 respondents across 18 countries in the region for over a decade. 
The survey also covers approximately 1000 respondents per country, and achieves 
national representation in most. 
 
The samples are nationally representative except for Brazil and Paraguay. The 
survey is produced by the NGO Latinobarómetro, a non-profit organization based in 
Santiago de Chile and directed by Marta Lagos (www.Latinobarómetro.org). The first 
survey was carried out in 1995 and covered 8 countries. Funding began with a grant from 
the European Community and is now from multiple sources. Access to the data is by 
purchase, with a 4 year lag in public release. This paper includes data collected in 2007, 
the latest available year. 
 
We found a number of paradoxes in which positive results as assessed by one 
indicator are negative as assessed by another.  These paradoxes challenge some of the 35 
standard assumptions in traditional economics, such as about the relationship between 
income and happiness. Secondly, they have important substantive links with several of 
the region’s realities, such as high levels of income inequality, volatile macroeconomic 
performance and high levels of insecurity, and generally low expectations of public 
institutions and faith in the capacity of the state to deliver – all of which are phenomena 




  Public perceptions are not always informed by objective trends; indeed some of 
the most important information may be found in the  gaps between perceptions and 
objective trends. One reason for these gaps is imperfect information. The public typically 
relies on anecdotes in the media for its information, such as  accounts of a recent 
corruption scandal or a botched privatization. In contrast, economists make assessments 
of the welfare gains or losses of particular policies based on aggregate and often complex 
data sets that are not easily understood by the average citizen. And “success” as measured 
by the marginal welfare benefits of a privatization that results in broader public access to 
services at similar tariff rates, for example, is hardly the makings of a news story that 
captures public attention.  
 
  At the individual level, it is typically not the poorest people that are most 
frustrated or unhappy with their conditions or the services that they have access to. 
Graham and Pettinato (2002) identified a phenomenon that is now termed the “happy 
peasant and frustrated achiever” paradox. Very poor and destitute respondents may report 36 
high or relatively high levels of well-being, while much wealthier ones with greater 
available opportunities report much lower ones. This may be because the poor 
respondents either have a higher natural level of cheerfulness or have lower expectations, 
while the wealthier ones have higher and possibly rising expectations (or are naturally 
more curmudgeon-like). Regardless of the balance between objective conditions and 
individual character traits driving the paradox, it presents challenges when inferring 
policy relevant information from opinion surveys.  
 
At the country level, Eduardo Lora and I find a related paradox that we have 
called the “paradox of unhappy growth”. As noted above, there is much debate in the 
literature about the extent to which per capita GDP levels and average happiness across 
countries are correlated. Based on the Gallup World Poll in 122 countries around the 
world, we find that countries with higher levels of per capita GDP have, on average, 
higher levels of happiness, as found by most scholars, as noted above. Yet controlling for 
levels of per capita GDP, they find that individuals in countries with positive growth rates 
have lower happiness levels – e.g. the paradox of unhappy growth. Deaton (2008), and 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008) also find evidence of an unhappy growth effect in the 
Gallup World Poll. [See Figure 6] 
 
  The paradox is stronger for countries above mean per capita GDP in the sample 
(which is above the middle income developing country level). For the richer countries, 
higher growth rates are associated with lower happiness levels, as well as with lower 
economic, health, job, and housing satisfaction. The only variable that is significant and 37 
negative on growth for poor countries is health satisfaction (and one could posit many 
reasons why the change in work habits that often accompanies growth booms might be 
negative for health). When the sample is split according to growth rates, the negative 
effects  of growth on well-being  only hold for countries with above average rates. 
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008), also based on a world wide Gallup sample as well as on 
earlier data from the World Values survey going back several decades, and again 
controlling for levels, find insignificant effects of growth in general, but negative effects 
of rapid growth, as in the case of the Irish miracle and the Korean growth boom.  
 
Graham and  Chattopadhyay  (2008), using Latinobarómetro data, also find 
evidence of an unhappy growth effect, albeit a modest one. When we include the current 
GDP growth rate in the equation, as well as the lagged growth rate from the previous year 
(controlling for levels), they find that the effects of growth rates – and lagged growth 
rates – are, for the most part, negative. [See Figure 7] 
 
It may well be that this unhappy growth is driven by its nature in rapidly changing 
economies, where growth is often accompanied by changes in rewards to different skill 
sets and increased job insecurity for some groups, and by increases in vertical or 
horizontal inequality or both. Latin America in recent decades certainly fits this pattern, 
which may help explain unexpected pockets of frustration in  relatively  prosperous 
countries like Chile. 
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  A third, related paradox is the “aspirations paradox”. Based on several different 
data sets, Eduardo Lora and I (Gallup and Latinobarometro) find that there is no clear 
relationship between average per capita income levels and satisfaction with education and 
health systems across countries in the region. Within countries, wealthier respondents are 
more likely to be satisfied with their health than are poor ones. Still, there is clearly an 
“optimism bias” in the responses of the poorest. Those in the highest quintile in the 
region hold 57% of the income (on average), while those in the poorest quintile hold 4%. 
But the differences in their perceptions are much smaller. Seventy-nine percent of 
individuals in the highest quintile declare themselves satisfied with their material or 
economic quality of life, while 57% of those in the lowest quintile say they are satisfied. 
There is a similar “optimism bias” in the responses of the poor as they assess their living 
conditions and public policies in their countries. Informal sector workers, for example, 
report less job insecurity than do formal sector workers, even though their objective 
conditions are far more precarious than their formal sector counterparts.  (See Inter-
American Development Bank, 2008, Chapter 7 and Graham and Chattopadhyay, 2008). 
 
This paradox is likely due to lower expectations and poorer available information 
among those living in poorer contexts, as well as lower expectations. For wealthier 
individuals and respondents in wealthier countries, aspirations and awareness may go up 
as much if not more rapidly than improvements in service provision (and/or economic 
growth). At the same time, there is also inconsistent usage of available information – 
such as test scores – among slightly wealthier respondents. A surprisingly small amount 
of school choice, for example, is informed by test score results (in Chapter 7 of Inter-39 
American Development Bank, 2008).  This among other things, may contribute to 
increased public frustration in the face of improvements in service quality, to the extent 
that improvements in quality also heighten awareness among previously less informed 
(and more satisfied) users.   
 
The paradoxes are of varying levels of importance, depending on the quality of 
life domain that is studied. Not surprisingly, economic domains are more affected by 
aspirations related paradoxes than other domains, such as health assessments or life 
purpose assessments (which are by definition more personal and subjective). The gaps 
between perceptions and objective measures, meanwhile, seem to be greater at the 
individual level rather than at the average country level (perhaps not a surprise as there is 
more variance); for richer rather than poorer countries (as relative deprivation effects 
seem to increase as average wealth increases); and for poorer rather than richer 
individuals (perhaps because they have less good information to make assessments, as 
well as lower expectations). (See Inter-American Development Bank, 2008, and Graham 
and Felton,  2006).  It is precisely in identifying these gaps between subjective and 
objective measures of welfare, and seeking an explanation for them, that our research 
provides a contribution to our understanding of quality of life in Latin America and 
beyond – and may inform the discussion on the appropriate definition of empowerment.  
 
  When one compares the responses of individuals within countries, there is clearly 
the optimism bias that we refer to above among the poor. While the individual subjective 
rankings of quality of services and satisfaction with personal economic situations of those 40 
in the wealthiest quintile are slightly higher than those in much poorer quintiles, the 
difference in the scores is an order of magnitude smaller than is the difference in their 
income levels or access to and quality of services.  
 
  As in many other contexts where happiness has been studied, the incomes of 
others have effects on individual happiness. While wealthier people are happier than less 
wealthy ones on average, people of similar income levels are less happy when the 
incomes of those in a relevant reference group, ranging from neighbors to professional 
cohorts, to towns and cities, are higher. (See Graham and Felton, 2006, Luttmer, 2005,  
and Kingdon and Knight, 2007). The same effect holds for Latin America, based on 
analysis from the Gallup Poll, as well as from the Latinobarómetro.  
 
For the Gallup Poll for Latin America, reference group income is positively 
correlated with life satisfaction (in a ladder of life question) but negatively correlated 
with satisfaction with one’s standard of living, job, and housing. [See Figure 8] In earlier 
work based on Latinobarómetro, Graham and Felton (2006) find that average country 
level incomes do not matter to individual happiness, but relative income differences – 
measured as distance from the mean for the average income in one’s country – does 
matter. Thus even though a poor peasant in Honduras is half as wealthy as a poor 
Chilean, the former is happier because his/her distance from mean income is smaller. 
This effect holds across cities of different sizes, but is stronger for large cities where there 
is more income variance and smaller for small cities, where average income levels are 
positively correlated with happiness (even though relative incomes are still negatively 41 
correlated). Because there is not a good income variable in the Latinobarómetro, the 
authors use an index of assets to proxy for wealth/income. See Graham and Felton 
(2006). [See Figure 9] 
 
  When the Gallup sample is split into above and below median income groups, the 
comparison effect holds for both groups, with the difference being that health satisfaction 
is significant and negative for the below average group, but insignificant for the rich, 
while job satisfaction is significant and negative  for the rich but not for the poor, 
implying that the poor and the rich value different domains as they make comparisons. 
When the sample is split into urban and rural, the effects largely hold for the urban 
cohorts but not for the rural ones (analogous, in a way, to the city size findings discussed 
above). 
 
  One project in our study – by Cárdenas, Di Maro, and Mejía (2009) – explores the 
different types of insecurity that can affect perceived well-being: nutritional, personal, 
and job insecurity. One major finding is that nutritional insecurity seems to be playing the 
main role in explaining perceived well-being. Job insecurity has a significant and 
negative, but smaller, effect on perceived well-being. Personal insecurity seems to have 
an effect only on some measures of life satisfaction. There is also evidence of adaptation 
to crime as crime increases.  Their benchmark results show that for the same increase in 
life satisfaction a 1-percentage point decrease in the incidence of nutritional insecurity is 
equivalent to 3.9-percentage-point decrease in job insecurity and 4.8-percentage-point 
decrease in the measure of personal insecurity. They also  find that responses  of life 42 
satisfaction to insecurity are  not dramatically different along  income distribution and 
schooling levels, although there are some modest ones. Individuals near the top of the 
income distribution manage to partly offset the negative consequences of nutritional 
insecurity in terms of life satisfaction and being illiterate seems to lead to a more negative 
response of life satisfaction to nutritional insecurity.  
 
The same authors also explored the way in which perceptions on the quality of 
education affect well-being and explore if educational quality perceptions are determined 
by objective educational outputs, such as international standardized tests scores (i.e. PISA 
scores) and individual educational attainment. Their results indicate that educational 
quality perceptions are positively correlated with standardized test scores but negatively 
correlated with individual educational attainment. [See Tables 3 and 4] They also find 
that favorable perceptions on the quality of education are positively associated with 
higher individual well-being, even after controlling for individual educational attainment 
and other traditional determinants of well-being. 
 
  As part of the same effort, Eduardo Lora and I analyzed health perceptions.  Most 
remarkable is the absence of a clear association between reported health satisfaction and 
objective health measures such as infant mortality or life expectancy. In part this reflects 
the paradox noted above: some of those who are relatively poor in this domain, such as 
respondents from Guatemala, report being relatively satisfied in comparison with those 
who by objective measures have much better health, such as respondents from Chile. 
Figure 10 illustrates the differences in health satisfaction across countries in Latin 43 
America. It also compares health satisfaction to two more objective measures of health: 
the Euro-quality five dimension index – in which respondents assess whether or not they 
have health problems along five dimensions: mobility, self care, the usual acts, pain, and 
anxiety – an self-report based index which correlates quite robustly with other objective 
health indicators; and health state, in which respondents evaluate their state of health on a 
ten point ladder scale. The lack of a clear correlation across countries between the more 
objective indicators of health and satisfaction with health is clear from the figure. We 
also find strong differences by socioeconomic strata, but which are not as strong as the 
gaps between objective indicators.  
 
  We also looked at job satisfaction. Research by Menezes-Filho, Corbi and Curi 
(2009) explored the determinants of job insecurity and social security participation.  They 
find that, on average, 20% of Latin American workers feel insecure about their jobs, with 
the numbers varying from about 10% in Paraguay to 27% in Mexico. About 40% of Latin 
American workers contribute to a retirement plan, with the lowest rates occurring in 
Bolivia, Honduras and Paraguay (20%) and the highest reaching 70% in Chile and 
Uruguay.  Moreover, having a regular job has a positive and significant association with 
life satisfaction, even conditional on health, wealth and other subjective measures that 
may capture respondents’ frame of mind at the time of the interviews. Job satisfaction is 
also strongly related to life satisfaction and job insecurity is strongly inversely related 
with life satisfaction. Rather surprisingly given the received wisdom about the precarious 
nature of informal sector employment, they find that formal labor market status 44 
(measured by the contribution  to a retirement plan) has no association with life 
satisfaction.  
 
  There is some evidence, however, that formal sector workers feel more strongly 
the negative effects of job insecurity on their lives. This could be explained by the low 
aspirations paradox: informal sector workers have already come to expect insecurity and 
are therefore less bothered by it, and/or by a selection bias: more risk averse workers 
select into more secure formal sector jobs, trading off flexibility and independence for 
security and remain anxious about it. A bad quality, low ranking formal sector job with 
long and rigid working hours could easily be worse than a relatively decent informal 
sector job. Individuals working in countries with more regulated social security systems 
seem to feel more confident about their jobs, while the opposite occurs in countries where 
firing costs are high relative to normal wages. In general, there is a similar optimism bias 
in the assessments of the poor in the domain satisfactions (and among informal workers, 
who tend to be poorer than the average) as there is in the income domain. 
 
In sum, our research on quality of life yields a number of insights that are relevant 
to the concept of empowerment and the challenges associated with incorporating it into 
the HDI. Foremost among these is the extent to which people with low expectations, 
limited information, and norms of poor service quality report more satisfaction with their 
services, jobs, and health, among other things, than respondents with higher standards 
and aspirations and better services. This phenomenon – which we have more generally 
called the “happy peasant and frustrated achiever” paradox  –  is relevant to both  the 45 
definition and measurement of empowerment. Less “empowered” respondents are also 
likely to demand less from their governments, their public institutions, and their lives.  
 
My other research (Graham, 2009) on happiness across the world suggests (but 
does  not  prove)  that this phenomenon is a regularity that is more general  across 
populations.  A more rigorous assessment is  relevant  to understanding different 
conceptions of empowerment – and that information from surveys could be a useful part 
of that effort. It is also a challenge for incorporating the concept of empowerment into the 
HDI, as responses to questions could vary a great deal because of norms and expectations 
rather than because of objective conditions. Understanding how that could contribute to, 
as well as complicate and bias, the measurement of welfare and human development is a 
more complex challenge.  Happiness surveys are surely suited to making headway on the 
first challenge, and may also inform progress on the second one.  
 
Lessons and Challenges for Policy 
 
Variance in norms and adaptation to those norms pose a major problem – both for 
applying happiness surveys to policy and for using the surveys to measure empowerment. 
This challenge is highlighted by the paradoxes discussed in both the empowerment and 
the quality of life sections of the paper.  
 
Happiness research world-wide shows that there is a remarkable human capacity 
to adapt to both prosperity and adversity. Thus people in Afghanistan are as happy as 
Latin Americans – above the world average – and Kenyans are as satisfied with their 46 
health care as Americans. Crime makes people unhappy, but it matters less to happiness 
when there is more of it; the same goes for both corruption and obesity. Freedom and 
democracy make people happy, but they matter less when these goods are less common. 
The bottom line is that people can adapt to tremendous adversity and retain their natural 
cheerfulness, while they can also have virtually everything – including good health – and 
be miserable.  
 
It is surely a good thing that most Americans have been able to adapt to the 
economic costs of the crisis and return to their natural happiness levels. And even better 
that the average person in Afghanistan can maintain cheerfulness and hope despite the 
situation they live in. While this capacity to adapt may be a good thing from the 
perspective of individual psychological welfare, it may also result in collective tolerance 
for conditions that would be unacceptable by most people’s standards. This may help 
explain why different societies tolerate such different norms of health, crime, and 
governance, both within and across countries.  
 
The adaptation conundrum is particularly relevant for a region like Latin America, 
where norms of wealth, health, governance, and public safety, among others, vary from 
advanced industrial economy standards, in countries such as Chile, to those of some of 
the poorest countries in the world, in countries like Guatemala and Honduras. Without 
understanding these norm differences, it is very difficult to craft policies to improve 
health, living conditions, and governance structures.  
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  This capacity to adapt – and the mediating role of norms and expectations – poses 
all sorts of measurement and comparison challenges – particularly in the study of the 
relationship between happiness and income. Can we really compare the happiness levels 
of a poor peasant in India, who reports to be very happy due to low expectations and/or 
due to a naturally cheery character, with those of a successful and very wealthy CEO, 
who reports to be miserable – due to his/her relative rankings compared to other CEO’s, 
or to a naturally curmudgeonly character?  
 
This is something that I have called the happy peasant and frustrated achiever 
problem. On one level it suggests that it (happiness) is all relative. At another it suggests 
that some unhappiness may be necessary to achieve economic and other sorts of progress. 
The examples of migrants who leave their home countries – and families – to provide 
better futures for their children, or revolutionaries who sacrifice their lives for the broader 
public good, come to mind, among others. This also begs more difficult questions, such 
as whether we should tell the poor peasant in Guatemala  how miserable he/she is 
according to objective income measures in order to encourage that peasant to seek a 
“better” life; or whether we worry more about addressing the millionaire’s misery or 
increasing the peasant’s happiness.  
 
  This happy peasant and frustrated achiever (or miserable millionaire) paradox also 
raises the question of the appropriate definition of happiness. What makes happiness 
surveys such a useful research tool is their open ended nature. The definition of happiness 
is left up to the respondent, and we do not impose a U.S. conception of happiness on 48 
Chinese respondents, or a Chinese definition on Chilean ones. The open ended nature of 
the definition results in the consistent patterns in the basic explanatory variables across 
respondents world-wide, in turn allowing us to control for those variables and explore 
variance in the effects of all sorts of other things on happiness, ranging from crime rates 
to commuting time to the nature of governing regimes.  
 
  At the same time, as we think about happiness as a measure of welfare with 
relevance to policy –  something that is increasingly in the public debate, then the 
definition does matter. Are we thinking of happiness as contentment in the Benthamite 
sense, or as a fulfilling life in the Aristotelian sense? There is still much room for debate. 
My studies of happiness around the world suggest that respondents’ conceptions of 
happiness vary according to their norms, expectations, and ability to adapt, among other 
things. Our priors as economists and policymakers likely suggest that some conceptions 
of happiness – such as the opportunity to lead a fulfilling life – are worth pursuing as 
policy objectives, while others – such as contentment alone – are not. Yet that choice 
entails normative judgments and a debate which we have not had. And some policy 
objectives that can advance human welfare over the long-term, such as overthrowing the 
French monarchy or reducing the national budget deficit, do not necessarily bring 
happiness to mind.  
 
This conundrum will give economists fodder for debate – about happiness and 
income, and beyond – for several years to come. And, despite the difficulty it poses for 
both method and economic philosophy, it will also force us to think deeply about what 49 
measures of human well-being are the most accurate benchmarks of economic progress 
and human development.  
 
While an interesting conceptual question, this adds to the challenge  of 
incorporating empowerment into the HDI, particularly in a context such as Latin America 
where there is a wide variance in norms of wealth, health, and governance. 
Empowerment is surely related to the ability to lead a fulfilling life. Yet precisely 
because conceptions of what a fulfilling life is may vary depending on how empowered 
people are –  which is not unrelated to their expectations –  the least empowered 
respondents may report to be satisfied with whatever system they live in. Increasing 
empowerment – like aspirations – may make people much less happy in the short term, 
while enhancing their welfare and capabilities in the long term.  
 
A related conceptual challenge is that trust in the system (both in economic 
system’s ability to provide fair opportunities and in public institutions more generally) 
may be inversely related to people’s ability to benefit from those systems and/or to their 
direct experience with the system. This is surely the case in Latin America. The least 
empowered people are the most trusting of public institutions (with which they have very 
little direct contact), for example, and at the same time have remarkable faith in the 
capacity of individual effort. Wealthier and more educated respondents, while accurately 
assessing the positive role that their higher levels of education have played in their 
advancement, are much more skeptical of the system’s ability to provide fair opportunity 
and of public institutions in general. This suggests that public frustration may initially 50 
increase when positive changes are made to enhance the empowerment of the poorest and 
least empowered citizens. While this could result in positive pressure for institutional 
reform in the long term, it could pose challenges to social cohesion and political stability 
in the shorter term. 
 
While  well-being  surveys cannot resolve these challenges, they can surely 
enhance our understanding of them, which is a first step towards their resolution. The 
process may also contribute to our ability to accurately define empowerment. From an 
empirical perspective, incorporating measures that gauge progress in that process into the 
HDI will surely provide a much broader picture of human well-being. Yet it may also 
make cross country comparisons based on that indicator more difficult, precisely because 
of the perceptions paradoxes and conceptual challenges spelled out throughout this paper. 
Comparing happy (un-empowered) peasants with frustrated (empowered) achievers or 
millionaires may tell us a lot, but ranking those responses in a composite cross-country 
score is a far more difficult task. 51 
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